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Abstract
Online review aggregators, such as TripAdvisor, HotelClub and OpenTable help con-
sumers identify the products and services that best match their preferences. The goal of this
study is to understand the impact of online review aggregators on firms and consumers. We
adopt Salop’s circular city model in which consumers initially do not know the locations of
the firms in the product space. The firms decide whether or not to be listed on an online re-
view aggregator’s website and choose their prices. When a firm resorts to the aggregator, its
location and price become observable to the consumers who visit the website. We consider
two different scenarios, depending on the possibility for online firms to offer discounts to
the consumers who book online. We show that in equilibrium not all firms will go online
– some will remain offline. Online firms attract more customers than their offline counter-
parts due to reduced mismatch costs, but face a tougher price competition. Comparing the
equilibrium prices, profits and the number of firms that go online across the scenarios, we
derive interesting conclusions from the private and the social standpoints.
Keywords: online review aggregators, price discrimination, competition.
JEL codes: C72, D43, D61, L11, L13, M31.
1 Introduction
Recent years have been characterized by the flourishing of online sales. At the beginning, mer-
chants created and used their own web pages both to increase their customer base and to facilitate
sales to existing customers. Then, we observed the proliferation of e-commerce companies, web
platforms, shopping websites and online auctions through which customers and merchants were
able to buy and sell a broad variety of products and services worldwide (e.g., eBay, Amazon,
Expedia). The next step was to gather consumers. Group buying became a common practice
thanks to the extraordinary expansion of Groupon, followed by several other similar websites.
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Each of these online selling methods has been analyzed in the economics and management lit-
erature, in order to understand the reasons of their success or failure, and their impact on market
competition and welfare.1
However, a key player in this market has been partially neglected, at least by the main-
stream theoretical literature: online review aggregators.2 They started to operate in the second
part of 2000s and enjoyed a very rapid expansion ever since, becoming key players in hotel
booking systems and restaurant reservation services, amongst others. We can distinguish review
aggregators that are open, such as Booking.com and OpenTable, from those that are closed,
such as Relais & Chateaux and Gourmet Society. The latter are exclusive clubs which select
their members based on income, education, and social status.3 Open aggregators are, obviously,
more diffused, as they do not charge fees for final users. Aggregators also differ in the qual-
ity/amount of information they provide to customers. The source of information may be mainly
left to consumer reviews (TripAdvisor, OpenTable, Urbanspoon), or it can be a combination of
both the aggregator itself and peer reviews (Booking.com, TheFork, RatesToGo, HotelClub).
In addition to information, some aggregators offer special services, such as personalized rec-
ommendations (Foursquare) and the possibility to book/purchase when the customer finds the
desired product (Booking.com, RatesToGo, HotelClub, OpenTable, Gourmet Society, TheFork,
Relais & Chateaux). The latter service is particularly convenient in the lodging and catering
sectors, for it allows to reduce consumer search costs by restricting the database to firms that are
available (have a free room or a table) on the required day. Often, consumers who book online
enjoy a discount, which could be either imposed by the aggregator or decided by the producer.
Discounts are more frequent in closed aggregators. All restaurants that appear on Gourmet So-
ciety’s website, for example, have agreed to offer a discount (25% off the total bill). On the
contrary, restaurants listed on TheFork are free to decide their discounting policy (about 20%-
30% offer a lower price to their online clients). Several aggregators, however, prohibit price
discrimination. Booking.com, for example, requires hotels to adhere to the rate parity policy by
which they cannot offer rooms at lower prices to other online booking platforms, nor to those
consumers who book through the hotel’s website or show up at the hotel’s lobby. Similarly,
diners using OpenTable pay the same price as those who do not reserve through the aggregator.
The rise of review aggregators is strictly related to the persistence of asymmetric information
in markets characterized by experience goods. Starting from the seminal contribution developed
by Akerlof (1970), such asymmetries have been widely studied especially for the case of ver-
tically differentiated goods. Insurances and warranties are commonly accepted solutions in the
market for lemons. However, the same toolkit can not be easily implemented in the case of hor-
izontally differentiated goods, as the perception of quality is subjective. Although firms often
advertise feautures/characteristics of their product, consumers do not always rely on such a bias
source of information. Partial solutions may be the brand’s reputation in a specific market niche
1Seminal contributions by Alba et al. (1997) on consumer incentives to shift to new distribution channels and
Bakos (1997) on electronic marketplaces that reduce search and increase competition among retailers have been
followed by a proliferation of papers touching different aspects of online commerce. The literature on group buying,
although pioneered by Che and Gale (1997), has only recently been developed, following the success of Groupon.
2In the next section we provide a brief description of the most relevant empirical papers that focus on the role of
review aggregators.
3Membership is usually awarded through a combination of different channels such as private invitation from other
members, interviews, and requires relatively expensive annual fees.
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and word-of-mouth. These remedies are not very effective in markets with unitary consumption,
such as hotels, restaurants, or museums.
Our paper delivers a theoretical model to understand the impact of online review aggre-
gators in horizontally differentiated markets. For exposition purposes only, through the paper
we focus on aggregators that provide information and booking services in the catering sector,
and we illustrate our model as a stylized version inspired by OpenTable or the Fork.4 They
represent instructive examples of online services available to a wide range of consumers. The
aggregator’s website provides detailed information about restaurants, including location, type
of cuisine, menu, prices, and dining atmosphere, thus helping the customer to narrow down her
search to a few options that best match her tastes. Consumers rely on the aggregator, whose
reputation is reinforced by the availability of peer reviews.5 The risk of fake reviews, although
very interesting, is not the object of our paper.
Having such a case study in mind, we use a model of horizontal differentiation a` la Salop
(1979) to analyze the equilibrium behavior of consumers, restaurants and an online review ag-
gregator. We assume that initially consumers do not know the locations of the restaurants in
the product space. The restaurants first decide whether or not to be listed on the aggregator’s
website and then set their prices. When a restaurant goes online, its location and price become
observable to the consumers that visit the website. Consumers who book a table through the
aggregator are called e-users, while those who choose a restaurant in a more traditional way
(yellow pages or randomly walking down the street) are called walkers. The proportion of e-
users in the population is exogenously fixed. Finally, we assume that the aggregator charges
restaurants a fixed fee.6
In the first setting that we consider, the aggregator prohibits restaurants to offer discounts to
e-users. In the second, the aggregator allows restaurants to price discriminate between walkers
and e-users. In both settings, we compute the equilibrium prices, profits, and the number of
online restaurants. We show that in equilibrium not all restaurants will go online – some will
remain offline. Online restaurants attract more customers than their offline counterparts due to
reduced mismatch costs, but they face a tougher price competition. We find that in the first
setting (uniform pricing), online restaurants charge a lower price than offline restaurants when
the proportion of e-users is sufficiently high. In the second setting (price discrimination), online
restaurants set the same price for walkers as offline restaurants, while offering a discount to
e-users.
Although simple, our model allows us to derive interesting conclusions both from the pri-
vate and the social standpoints. In particular, the analysis that we carry out brings forth three
interesting results. First, for a given number of online restaurants, we find that allowing dis-
counts may hurt the restaurants. Specifically, when the proportion of e-users in the population is
4TheFork operates in the restaurant market. It is currently available in France, Monaco, Spain, Belgium, Italy,
and Switzerland under the names LaFourchette, ElTenedor and TheFork.
5OpenTable launched in 2008 the OpenTable Reviews Program, through which diners submit restaurant reviews
and feedback. Only verified customers can write a review. On TheFork all customers are invited to leave a review
(an average of 70% reviews per restaurant is currently available).
6In reality, some aggregators charge a fixed per-year fee (Urbanspoon), some a per-client/reservation fee (The-
Fork), and others a setup fee combined with a monthly fee and/or per-reservation fee (OpenTable). TripAdvisor
charges businesses for clickable ads and business listings. See Moraga-Gonzalez and Wildenbeest (2012) for fees
charged by shopbots, or comparison sites.
3
relatively low, online restaurants are trapped in the prisoner’s dilemma. Each restaurant has an
incentive to offer a discount to capture more e-users; however, as they all offer a discount, the
final price may be too low and the restaurants end up losing in comparison to uniform pricing.
Second, we consider the effect of price discrimination on the equilibrium number of online
restaurants. In our theoretical framework, the social optimum is achieved when all restaurants
go online. Hence, in order for discounting to be beneficial, it has to increase the number of on-
line restaurants as compared to the uniform pricing setting. We find that discounting is socially
preferable when the proportion of e-users is high and the fixed online fee is low. In this param-
eter region, price discrimination allows online restaurants to charge a higher price for walkers
while profitably competing for e-users. As a result, more restaurants will choose to go online.
Third, we evaluate the aggregator’s optimal policy and find that allowing discounts is never
profitable for the aggregator, when the aggregator can select the online fee. Hence, potential
conflicts of interest between the aggregator and the social planner may appear. In particular,
following previous results, this happens when the proportion of e-users is relatively high. In
addition, in such region it is more likely that the restaurants would profit from discounting. It
would be, therefore, extremely important for the policy maker to intervene in order to guarantee
an efficient solution.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we review the literature. The model
is presented in Section 3. The two settings mentioned above are analyzed in Sections 4 and 5,
respectively. In Section 6 we report the choice of the aggregator. Concluding remarks appear in
Section 7.
2 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to explaining the private and social impacts of online selling when mer-
chants resort to a review aggregator in order to disclose certain product features to final con-
sumers. The role of review aggregators has so far received attention mainly in empirical studies.
Ghose et al. (2012) show that consumers base their purchases on the available reviews. Ander-
son and Magruder (2012) suggest a positive relation between reviews and profits, thus confirm-
ing previous results on the effect of word-of-mouth (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006) and reviews
by professional critics (Reinstein and Snyder, 2005; Hilger et al., 2011) on sales. Clearly, the
effectiveness of online reviews depends on their credibility.7 In our model we abstract from the
risk of fake reviews and assume that consumers trust the aggregator.8
We also extend the literature that examines the impact of online sales on offline prices. Em-
pirical papers analyzing this issue are, among others, Brown and Goolsbee (2002) on individual
insurance policies, and Morton et al. (2001) on pricing behavior of car dealerships. On the
theoretical side, Lal and Sarvary (1999) and Zettelmeyer (2000) both consider firms compet-
7To increase their credibility, aggregators can allow only certified consumers to write a review. Brynjolfsson
and Smith (2000) argue that branding awareness and trust are important sources of heterogeneity among Internet
retailers. However, a 2012 Nielsen poll of more than 28000 Internet consumers from 56 countries revealed that
online consumer reviews are the second most-trusted source of brand information after suggestions from friends and
family.
8Dellarocas (2006), Mayzlin (2006) and Mayzlin et al. (2013), inter alia, study the phenomenon of manipulated
reviews.
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ing through alternative distribution channels such as online shopping. They find that online
shopping does not necessarily increase price competition. Similar results can be found in Logi-
nova (2009), who provides a theoretical framework to study competition between online and
offline retailers. She shows that there exist circumstances under which conventional stores may
increase their prices when online rivals enter the market. One common feature of such theo-
retical models is that online shopping has pros and cons: on the one hand, it reduces travelling
costs; on the other hand, consumers prefer to inspect a specific item before purchasing it. In our
model, on the contrary, going online reduces mismatch costs for consumers without causing any
discontent.
A stream of literature in economics and marketing has examined information disclosure in
monopolistic and competitive settings. The seminal work of Lewis and Sappington (1994) con-
siders a firm’s incentive to reveal its private information to two different types of consumers
in order to facilitate price discrimination. Anand and Shachar (2011) examine television net-
works which advertise their own show. This results in a trade-off as it increases the demand for
some viewers, but reduces that for others. In our paper price discrimination between e-users and
walkers may lead to a similar trade-off, although we focus mainly on price effects as demands
remain unchanged. Recent papers by Sun (2010) and Gu and Xie (2013) study the incentives
for producers to reveal multiple (vertical and horizontal) product attributes.
Our paper is also related to the practice of selective discounting, which provides opportu-
nities for price discrimination.9 The conventional result is that price discrimination is privately
adopted by producers and can be also welfare improving, as it allows to serve weaker markets
which would otherwise be cut out (see Schmalensee, 1981; Varian, 1985; Stigler, 1987, inter
alia). Regarding the specific case of third-degree price discrimination, it may decrease welfare
when the demand function is linear (Aguirre et al., 2010; Aguirre, 2012). In our paper we con-
sider a scenario in which the aggregator allows restaurants to price discriminate between e-users
and walkers. Although the total quantity is constant regardless of the presence of the aggregator,
the society at large may benefit if the number of firms going online increases when discounts
are allowed. Edelman et al. (2014) examine the profitability and implications of online discount
vouchers such as those used by Groupon.10 Their paper is pertinent to ours as such a pricing
strategy facilitates price discrimination. They found that it pays off when merchants are patient
and relatively unknown, given that discount vouchers also activate informative advertising. In
our model, however, possible advertising effects are not taken into account.
Recent advances in technology opened up new opportunities for firms to implement innova-
tive selling strategies (Shugan, 2004). One of these is group buying, whereby consumers obtain
a discount if they group and achieve a required group size (see Che and Gale, 1997; Anand and
Aron, 2003; and Jing and Xie, 2011). Other marketing strategies are referral reward programs
(see Biyalogorsky et al., 2001), one-to-one promotion (Shaffer and Zhang, 2002) and advance
selling (Xie and Shugan, 2001), among others. These papers explore very interesting issues
which are related to our basic idea. They can provide opportunity for further research.
9This has been studied in seminal contributions by Varian (1980) and Narasimhan (1984, 1988), among others.
10Empirical surveys on Groupon are provided by Byers et al. (2011), Dholakia (2011), and Dholakia and Tsabar
(2011), inter alia.
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3 The Model
The players in our model are uninformed consumers, restaurants and an online review aggrega-
tor. (Think of tourists visiting Paris and looking for a place to have dinner.) Consumers differ in
their preferences for cuisine (French, Italian, Asian) and dining atmosphere (traditional, bistro,
trendy, brasserie). We use Salop circular city to model consumer heterogeneity. Consumers of
total mass one are uniformly distributed on a circle of circumference one. N restaurants are
located equidistantly around the circle; each produces a meal at the constant marginal cost c.
When a consumer dines in a restaurant located at distance x from him, his utility from consum-
ing a meal (his valuation) is
v − tx,
where t represents the intensity of consumer tastes.
We assume that consumers do not know the locations of the restaurants nor their prices.
Only when a consumer enters a restaurant, she observes its price, and only after the consumer
has a meal there, she learns its location on the circle. Since the expected distance between
the consumer and a randomly chosen restaurant is 1/4, the consumer’s expected utility equals
v − t/4. We also assume that as long as the restaurant’s price does not exceed the consumer’s
expected utility, the consumer dines at that restaurant. (She does not check out other places for
a lower price.) Thus, in equilibrium each restaurant will set its price equal to
v − t
4
,
leaving all consumers with zero expected payoffs.
We now introduce the online review aggregator, such as OpenTable, Urbanspoon, or The-
Fork. Suppose for a moment that all restaurants appear on the aggregator’s website. This means
that a consumer can visit the aggregator’s website and learn the locations and prices of the N
restaurants. If all consumers visit the website, then we have Salop’s circular city model (Salop,
1979). In equilibrium each restaurant will set its price equal to
c+
t
N
.
To keep the equilibrium analysis as simple as possible, we assume that v is sufficiently high,
v − c > 3t
4
. (1)
This assumption guarantees that the consumer located halfway between two adjacent restaurants
(having to travel 1/(2N) along the circle) receives a strictly positive payoff:
v − t
2N
> c+
t
N
holds for any N ≥ 2.
To make the model more realistic, we assume that only some consumers visit the aggrega-
tor’s website. Let α ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of consumers who find it worth their time and
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Figure 1: Salop model
9
Figure 1: Online and Offline Restaurants on the Salop Circle
effort to check out the restaurants online. We will refer to these consumers as e-users, and to the
rest (who choose a restaurant by simply walking down the street) as walkers.
Next, we assume that in order to appear on the aggregator’s website, a restaurant should
pay a fixed fee k > 0 to the aggregator. Let n denote the number of restaurants that go online
(endogenously determined). Again, we assume that these n restaurants are located equidistantly
around the circle. In Figure 1,N = 12 and n = 3. Restaurants 1, 5 and 9 are on the aggregator’s
website, while the other restaurants are not. We will call the restaurants on the aggregator’s
website online restaurants and the rest – offline restaurants.
In the next section we study a setting in which online restaurants charge the same price
to all their customers (walkers and e-users). In Section 5 we allow online restaurants to offer
discounts to those consumers who book a table through the aggregator (i.e., to e-users).
4 Setting I: Online Restaurants Charge Uniform Prices
In this setting we assume that online restaurants do not price discriminate and charge the same
price to walkers and e-users. Let p∗off be the price that offline restaurants charge in a symmetric
Nash equilibrium, and let p∗on be the price of online restaurants. Since we have assumed that a
walker dines at the first restaurant she walks in (as long as the price does not exceed his expected
utility),
p∗off = v −
t
4
.
Each of N − n offline restaurants will attract (1 − α)/N customers (1/N of all walkers) and
earn
pi∗off =
1− α
N
(p∗off − c) =
1− α
N
(
v − t
4
− c
)
.
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Now let us find p∗on and pi∗on. Suppose that there are at least two restaurants on the aggrega-
tor’s website, n ≥ 2, and p∗on ≤ p∗off = v − t/4 (proved in the Appendix). Then in equilibrium
each online restaurant will attract (1− α)/N + α/n customers (1/N of all walkers and 1/n of
all e-users).
indifferent consumer indifferent consumer
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Figure 2: Indifferent consumer
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Figure 2: Determining the Equilibrium Price
Consider a deviation by an online restaurant from p∗on to p. The restaurant will attract (1 −
α)/N + 2αxˆ customers, where xˆ is determined by
v − p− xˆt = v − p∗on −
(
1
n
− xˆ
)
t,
xˆ =
1
2n
+
p∗on − p
2t
.
(See Figure 2.) Hence, the profit of this restaurant will be(
1− α
N
+ 2α
(
1
2n
+
p∗on − p
2t
))
(p− c).
The equilibrium requires
p∗on = arg max
p≤v− t
4
(
1− α
N
+ α
(
1
n
+
p∗on − p
t
))
(p− c). (2)
Differentiating the objective function with respect to p and setting the derivative to zero leads to
−α
t
(p− c) + 1− α
N
+ α
(
1
n
+
p∗on − p
t
)
= 0.
Substituting p = p∗on into the above equation and solving for p∗on yield
p∗on = min
{
c+
(1− α)t
αN
+
t
n
, v − t
4
}
. (3)
In equilibrium, each online restaurant earns
pi∗on =
(
1− α
N
+
α
n
)
(p∗on − c). (4)
Thus, we have the following lemma.
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Lemma 1 (Prices and Profits in Setting I, for a Given Value of n). Consider Setting I and
suppose there are n online restaurants. Then in equilibrium each offline restaurant will charge
p∗off = v −
t
4
and earn
pi∗off =
1− α
N
(
v − t
4
− c
)
.
Online restaurants will set their prices equal to
p∗on(n) =
{
c+ (1−α)tαN +
t
n if α ≥ α0(n)
v − t4 if α < α0(n),
earning
pi∗on(n) =
{(
1−α
N +
α
n
)2 t
α if α ≥ α0(n)(
1−α
N +
α
n
) (
v − t4 − c
)
if α < α0(n),
where
α0(n) =
t
t+N
(
v − t4 − tn − c
) .
The results of this lemma are intuitive. When more consumers visit the aggregator’s web-
site, α ≥ α0(n), the e-users become the primary target for online restaurants. This leads the
restaurants to charge
p∗on(n) = c+
(1− α)t
αN
+
t
n
< v − t
4
.
Ceteris paribus, α is more likely to fall into the region [α0(n), 1] for larger values of n (α′0(n) <
0). As n increases, p∗on(n) decreases.
On the contrary, when α < α0(n), the walkers become the primary target for online restau-
rants, and they charge
p∗on = v −
t
4
.
This is more likely to happen when n is small.
Next, we find how many restaurants will go online in equilibrium. Recall that in order to
appear on the aggregator’s website, a restaurant should pay k to the aggregator. Hence, the
equilibrium number of online restaurants is determined by
pi∗off = pi
∗
on(n)− k. (5)
The equilibrium profit of an offline restaurant, pi∗off , does not depend on n, while the equilibrium
profit of an online restaurant, pi∗on(n), decreases in n and approaches pi∗off as n → ∞ (see the
proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix). Thus, (5) has a unique solution as long as k is not
prohibitively large.
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Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Number of Online Restaurants in Setting I). In Setting I, the equi-
librium number of online restaurants is given by
n∗ =

N if k ≤ k1
α√
(k+ 1−αN (v− t4−c))αt − 1−αN
if k ∈ (k1, k2]
α(v− t4−c)
k if k > k2,
where
k1 =
α
(
v − t4 − c
)
N
−max
{
v − t4 − c
N
− t
N2α
, 0
}
and
k2 =
α
(
v − t4 − c
)
N
+max
{
α
(
v − t4 − c
)2
t
− v −
t
4 − c
N
, 0
}
.
Observe that when
α ≤ t
N
(
v − t4 − c
) ,
max
{
α
(
v − t4 − c
)2
t
− v −
t
4 − c
N
, 0
}
= max
{
v − t4 − c
N
− t
N2α
, 0
}
= 0.
Hence, k1 = k2 and the set (k1, k2] is empty for these values of α. When
α >
t
N
(
v − t4 − c
) ,
k1 < k2. While k2 is always positive, k1 may be negative. If this happens, then k ≤ k1 in
the above proposition is an empty set. That is, even when the fixed online fee is zero, not all
restaurants will choose to go online.
Recall that our equilibrium analysis goes through when there are at least two online restau-
rants, n ≥ 2. This assumption imposes an upper limit to the value of k. It follows from
Proposition 1 that n∗ ≥ 2 if and only if
k ≤ α
2
(
v − t
4
− c
)
. (6)
Finally, we find the socially optimal number of online restaurants and compare it with n∗.
The socially optimal number, denoted by nso, minimizes the mismatch costs incurred by the
e-users:
min
n
α
t
4n
.
(As k represents a transfer from an online restaurant to the aggregator, it is not a cost to the
society. That is why nk does not enter the objective function.) Hence,
nso = N.
While efficiency requires all restaurants to go online, in equilibrium n∗ ≤ N , with strict in-
equality when k > k1. The private and the social interests are, therefore, not aligned when k is
sufficiently high.
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5 Setting II: Online Restaurants Charge Different Prices to Walk-
ers and E-users
Suppose that online restaurants can offer discounts to those consumers who book a table through
the aggregator. It is easy to see that in equilibrium they will charge walkers the price
p†on = v −
t
4
and e-users
p†
on
(n) = c+
t
n
.
This implies the discount of
v − t
4
− t
n
− c,
which is positive for all n ≥ 2 due to the assumption (1). Thus, in equilibrium each online
restaurant earns the profit
pi†on(n) =
1− α
N
(p†on − c) +
α
n
(p†
on
− c) = 1− α
N
(
v − t
4
− c
)
+
αt
n2
.
Lemma 2 (Equilibrium Prices and Profits in Setting II, for a Given Value of n). Consider Setting
II and suppose there are n online restaurants. Then the equilibrium prices and profits are given
by:
p†off = p
†
on = v −
t
4
,
p†
on
(n) = c+
t
n
,
pi†off =
1− α
N
(
v − t
4
− c
)
,
and
pi†on(n) =
1− α
N
(
v − t
4
− c
)
+
αt
n2
.
Let us compare the equilibrium prices and profits of online restaurants across the two set-
tings for a given value of n. In Setting I, an online restaurant serves (1−α)/N+α/n customers
at price p∗on. In Setting II, it serves (1 − α)/N customers at price p†on and α/n customers at
price p†on. When α < α0(n),
p†
on
(n) < p∗on(n) = p
†
on,
which immediately implies
pi∗on(n) > pi
†
on(n).
In other words, discounting hurts online restaurants. When α ≥ α0(n),
p†
on
(n) < p∗on(n) < p
†
on
11
and the comparison between pi∗on(n) and pi
†
on(n) can go in either direction. Specifically,
pi∗on(n) =
(
1− α
N
+
α
n
)2 t
α
> pi†on(n) =
1− α
N
(
v − t
4
− c
)
+
αt
n2
if and only if
α < α1(n) =
t
t+N
(
v − t4 − 2tn − c
) .
Since α1(n) > α0(n) for any value of n, we have the following result.
Lemma 3 (Comparing Equilibrium Profits of Online Restaurants in Settings I and II, for a Given
Value of n). Suppose there are n online restaurants. The restaurants lose from discounting,
pi∗on(n) > pi
†
on(n), when α < α1(n).
We would like to stress that in the above lemma the number of online restaurants is fixed.
Consider Setting I and assume that there are n online restaurants. Now suppose that the aggrega-
tor allows discounting. Lemma 3 indicates that the ability to price discriminate between walkers
and e-users benefits online restaurants only when α – the fraction of e-users in the population
– is sufficiently high. Low values of α give rise to the prisoner’s dilemma. We demonstrate
its existence in the next two paragraphs. Specifically, we prove that an online restaurant has
a unilateral incentive to charge different prices to walkers and e-users, provided that the other
online restaurants do not price discriminate.
In the absence of discounts, the equilibrium prices and profits are as in Lemma 1. If we
allow one restaurant to price discriminate, will it choose to do so? In the Appendix we show
that when α ≥ α0(n), the deviating restaurant will charge walkers v − t/4 and e-users
pdev = c+
(1− α)t
2αN
+
t
n
< p∗on = c+
(1− α)t
αN
+
t
n
, (7)
thereby increasing its profit. However, when all online restaurants are allowed to price discrim-
inate, they charge e-users
p†
on
= c+
t
n
< pdev.
When α ∈ (α0, α1), online restaurants lose compared to Setting I where discounts are not
allowed.
We also show in the Appendix that when α < α0(n), the deviating restaurant will charge
walkers v − t/4 and e-users
pdev =
c+ v
2
− t
8
+
t
2n
. (8)
We verify that, again,
p†
on
= c+
t
n
< pdev < p∗on = v −
t
4
.
The result is, as before, intuitive. As more online restaurants adopt the discount strategy for e-
users, the price that e-users pay drops, and the restaurants get trapped in the prisoner’s dilemma
for all α < α0(n).
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Next, we calculate the equilibrium number of online restaurants:
pi†off = pi
†
on(n)− k,
1− α
N
(
v − t
4
− c
)
=
1− α
N
(
v − t
4
− c
)
+
αt
n2
− k,
n† = min
{√
αt
k
,N
}
.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Number of Online Restaurants in Setting II). In Setting II, the equi-
librium number of online restaurants is given by
n† =
{
N if k ≤ αt
N2√
αt
k if k >
αt
N2
.
We see that n† ≤ nso = N , with strict inequality for k > αt/N2. Put differently, the social
welfare is maximized only when the fixed cost k is sufficiently small, k ≤ αt/N2. Hence, also
in this setting, the private and the social interests fail to coincide when k is sufficiently high.
It is straightforward to show that n† ≥ 2 if and only if
k ≤ αt
4
.
Comparing this condition with (6), we notice that
αt
4
<
α
2
(
v − t
4
− c
)
holds under the assumption (1). The maximum value of k compatible with the equilibrium
number of online restaurants being at least two in both settings is, therefore,
kmax =
αt
4
.
For the rest of our analysis we will assume that k does not exceed kmax.
Finally, we compare the equilibrium number of online restaurants in this setting with that in
Setting I. It immediately follows from Propositions 1 and 2 that when k ≤ min{αt/N2, k1},
n† = n∗ = nso = N . When k > min
{
αt/N2, k1
}
, either n∗ < n† ≤ nso or n† < n∗ ≤ nso.
The first (second) case implies that allowing (prohibiting) discounts is beneficial for the society.
Note that
α√(
k + 1−αN
(
v − t4 − c
))
α
t − 1−αN
>
√
αt
k
(the left-hand side is the equilibrium number of online restaurants in Setting I when k ∈ (k1, k2]
and the right-hand side is the equilibrium number of online restaurants in Setting II when k >
αt/N2) if and only if
k >
t
4α
(
α
(
v − t4 − c
)
t
− 1− α
N
)2
= k3,
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and
α
(
v − t4 − c
)
k
>
√
αt
k
(the left-hand side the equilibrium number of online restaurants in Setting I when k > k2 and the
right-hand side is the equilibrium number of online restaurants in Setting II when k > αt/N2)
always holds under the assumption (1) and for k ≤ kmax.
Tedious algebra (see the Appendix) reveals that the thresholds k1, k2 and αt/N2 and the
critical value k3 (obtained above) line up as
k3 <
αt
N2
< k1 ≤ k2 (9)
when
α <
t
N
(
v − t4 − c− tN
) = α2
and as
k1 <
αt
N2
< k3 < k2 (10)
when α > α2. Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium Number of Online Restaurants in Settings I and II and Efficiency).
Let α < α2. In this case the socially optimal number of online restaurants is reached in both
settings when
k ≤ αt
N2
.
Otherwise, prohibiting discounts is beneficial (provides a higher number of online restaurants).
When α > α2, the socially optimal number of online restaurants is reached in both settings
when k ≤ k1. For high values of k, k > k3, prohibiting discounts is beneficial. On the contrary,
allowing discounts is beneficial for intermediate values of k, k ∈ (k1, k3).
Figure 3 provides a useful representation of the above results.11 Apart from the case in which
the fee is very low, k < min
{
k1, αt/N
2
}
, the equilibrium number of restaurants that decide to
go online depends on the interplay between α and k. Consider the admissible parametric region
in which k ≤ kmax. If the fraction of e-users is relatively low, then uniform pricing (Setting
I) allows more restaurants to go online when k > αt/N2. Moreover, for k ∈ (αt/N2, k1),
the efficient solution is reached, as (n† <)n∗ = nso. The intuition goes as follows. From the
discussion after Lemma 3 we know that online restaurants lose from price discrimination, as
they get trapped in the prisoner’s dilemma. A lower number of restaurants would, therefore, be
able to afford the fee for being listed on the aggregator’s website. On the contrary, for relatively
high values of α, online restaurants can charge higher prices for walkers while at the same time
competing for e-users (their main target). In this region discounting is socially preferred, as more
restaurants can afford the fee to go online. Notice also that, when k ∈ (max{0, k1}, αt/N2),
the efficient outcome is guaranteed under price discrimination, as (n∗ <)n† = nso. Finally,
observe that the higher is the proportion of e-users in the population, the larger is the region
where discounting is socially preferred.
11In drawing the picture, we fixed the following parameter values: v = 2, c = 0, t = 1, and N = 12.
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This picture holds for
v − c >
t
4Nα
(4 + (5N − 4)α)
In such a case,
αt
4
> k3 only when α2 < α <
4t
4N(v − c) + t(4− 5N)
.
1
Figure 3: Equilibrium and Efficient Number of Restaurants
6 The Aggregator’s Optimal Policy
In this section we make the aggregator an active player. Suppose for a moment that the aggrega-
tor can decide whether to prohibit (Setting I) or to allow discounts (Setting II). If the aggregator’s
profit is simply the product of the equilibrium number of online restaurants and the fee k, then
it will choose the setting that yields the highest number of online restaurants.
To make our model more realistic, we assume that the aggregator not only decides whether to
allow discounts, but also chooses the online fee k. Will the aggregator’s optimal policy result in
N restaurants (the socially optimal number) going online? Consider Setting I. The aggregator’s
profit is kn∗, where n∗ is a decreasing function of k. As it was noted right after Proposition 1,
α <
t
N
(
v − t4 − c
)
implies
k1 = k2 =
α
(
v − t4 − c
)
N
.
If this is the case, then
kn∗(k) =
{
kN if k ≤ k1
α
(
v − t4 − c
)
if k > k1.
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Obviously, the aggregator’s profit attains its maximum,
α
(
v − t
4
− c
)
,
at any k ≥ k1. Note that k = k1 induces all restaurants to go online, n∗(k1) = N . This is
socially optimal.
When
α >
t
N
(
v − t4 − c
) ,
k1 < k2, so
kn∗(k) =

kN if k ≤ k1
kα√
(k+ 1−αN (v− t4−c))αt − 1−αN
if k ∈ (k1, k2]
α
(
v − t4 − c
)
if k > k2.
It is easy to show that k2 yields a higher profit to the aggregator than k1. Indeed,
α
(
v − t
4
− c
)
> k1N = α
(
v − t
4
− c
)
−N max
{
v − t4 − c
N
− t
N2α
, 0
}
,
which holds as the term
max
{
v − t4 − c
N
− t
N2α
, 0
}
is strictly positive for
α >
t
N
(
v − t4 − c
) .
Therefore, k1, which leads to the socially optimal number of online restaurants, will not be
chosen by the aggregator.
In Setting II, the aggregator’s profit is
kn†(k) =
{
kN if k ≤ αt
N2√
αtk if k > αt
N2
.
It is easy to see that kn†(k) is increasing in k, which immediately implies that the optimal k is
kmax = αt/4. The aggregator’s maximum profit in Setting II equals
αt
2
.
This is lower than what the aggregator can get in Setting I: the inequality
αt
2
< α
(
v − t
4
− c
)
always holds due to the assumption (1).
We summarize the above results in the following proposition.
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Proposition 4 (The Aggregator’s Optimal Policy). When it comes to shaping its policy, the
aggregator will prohibit discounts. The fee chosen by the aggregator will induce all restaurants
to go online when
α <
t
N
(
v − t4 − c
) .
For other values of α, the optimal k will result in less than the socially optimal number of online
restaurants.
When the aggregator chooses the fee k, it faces a trade-off, as increasing the fee reduces
the number of restaurants that can afford to go online. In such a case, prohibiting discounts is
preferred by the aggregator as it allows to charge a sufficiently high fee without losing too many
restaurants. Proposition 4 indicates that when the proportion of e-users is low, the aggregator
will choose k that induces all restaurants to go online. Allowing discounts is less profitable to
the aggregator as the number of restaurants that could afford to go online decreases more rapidly
than under uniform pricing.
This has relevant policy implications, as the interests of the aggregator may not always be
aligned with those of the society. In particular, when the proportion of e-users is relatively
high, imposing uniform pricing implies that a lower number of restaurants would go online, as
we can deduce from Proposition 3 (or Figure 3). In addition, for relatively high values of α,
the restaurants are more likely to gain when adopting price discrimination. In such an interval
region, as a consequence, the social planner should intervene to restore price discrimination.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we used a model of horizontal product differentiation a` la Salop (1979) to analyze
the impact of an online review aggregator on the equilibrium behavior of consumers and pro-
ducers in a market with asymmetric information. In particular, we imagined a situation where
uninformed consumers (tourists visiting a new city) are looking for a place to eat. The aggre-
gator was assumed to provide accurate information about the restaurants listed on its website
(online restaurants), therefore helping consumers to find their best match. The population of
consumers was divided into those willing to spend time on the Internet (e-users) and those en-
joying roaming around the city while looking for a place to eat (walkers).
We considered two different settings, depending on whether online restaurants can offer
discounts to e-users. We showed that in the first setting (that of uniform pricing), online restau-
rants charge a lower price than their offline counterparts only when the proportion of e-users is
sufficiently high. In the second setting, in which discounting is allowed, we found that e-users
always pay less than walkers. For a given number of online restaurants, we highlighted that the
profitability of price discrimination crucially depends on the composition of consumers. If the
population of consumers is mainly composed by walkers, then online restaurants do not gain
from discounting, as they end up being trapped in the prisoner’s dilemma. As compared to uni-
form pricing, they cannot increase the price for walkers, but they are pressured by competition
to offer a discount to e-users. On the contrary, price discrimination pays off when the proportion
of e-users is relatively high. This was the first important finding of our analysis.
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Our paper also provided interesting predictions on the social desirability of allowing dis-
counting. We computed the equilibrium number of online restaurants in both settings and com-
pared it with the first best for the society, which in our model simply requires all restaurants
to go online. We showed that, apart from the case in which the fee charged by the aggregator
is very small, it is again the composition of consumers that plays a major role. When walkers
predominate, then uniform pricing allows more restaurants to go online, as under discounting
online restaurants are trapped in the prisoner’s dilemma. On the contrary, when the proportion
of e-users is relatively high, then online restaurants gain from price discrimination, so a higher
number of restaurants can afford to pay the fee for being listed online. Hence, discounting
is socially preferred. In both cases the first best can be reached when the fee charged by the
aggregator is sufficiently low.
Finally, we considered the aggregator’s optimal policy regarding the fee and whether to
impose uniform pricing or to allow discounts for e-users. We discovered that the aggregator
prefers uniform pricing as it can increase the fee without losing too many subscribers (online
restaurants). However, this revealed potential areas of conflict between the aggregator and the
social planner. In particular, when e-users predominate, imposing uniform pricing implies that a
lower number of restaurants can afford to go online, and this has obvious negative consequences
in terms of social welfare.
Throughout the paper we used the catering sector for exposition purposes. The results of
our model are applicable to the lodging sector, where the role of review aggregators is more and
more prominent.12 Related to our last result, recent concerns have been raised in the EU regard-
ing anticompetitive effects of the rate parity policy adopted by hotel booking portals such as
Booking.com, Expedia, and HRS. The German competition authority alleged that the rate par-
ity policy imposed by HRS virtually eliminated competition for low-end (cheaper) rooms, thus
reducing the number of hotels in the market.13 In France, hotel unions accused Booking.com
of using the price parity clause to prevent entry of alternative reservation platforms. After an
intervention of the French competition authority, Booking.com removed the price parity clause
from its contracts.14 Competition regulators in Italy, UK and Sweden echoed such concerns. In
the UK, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) accepted in 2014 formal commitments from Book-
ing.com and Expedia Inc. (Expedia) to allow online travel agents and hotels to offer discounts
on rates for hotel rooms.15 In the U.S., a class action lawsuit has been filed against Expedia,
Orbitz, Travelocity, Marriott, Starwood, InterContinental, Hilton and other major online travel
agencies (OTAs) and hotel chains for price fixing.16
The analysis carried out in this paper relied on many simplifying assumptions. First of
all, we considered the presence of only one aggregator, and supposed that it conveys reliable
information at almost zero cost for consumers. This can be justified by the fact that consumers
tend to resort to just a few trusted sources of information, those who successfully win the race to
12In the EU, following a survey conducted by Coach Omnium, 93% of consumers use the Internet to find a hotel,
and 70% of online hotel bookings are made through hotel booking platforms.
13Bundeskartellamt continues to view HRS’s best price clause critically, see
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2013/25 07 2013 HRS.html
14See Authorite´ de la Concurrence, Re´publique Franc¸aise, Press Release, 15 December 2014: Online Hotel Book-
ing Sector.
15See http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/competition-act-and-cartels/ca98/closure/online-booking
16See Nikita Turik, et al. v. Expedia, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 3:1204365 Northern District of Texas, 2012.
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become the reference points for consumers unfamiliar with certain product characteristics. For
this reason, aggregators usually do not charge final users, but compete for rents coming from the
firms that want to get online visibility. Therefore, introducing competition among aggregators
would result in lower fees being charged to firms, without changing the qualitative results of our
analysis.
A second limitation of our model is that it focuses only on uninformed consumers. In an
extension of the basic setting, we introduced local consumers, who previously had the oppor-
tunity to try different restaurants in the city.17 Once a local consumer finds a restaurant that
satisfies her tastes, she dines only there, provided that the price does not exceed her valuation.
Assuming a proportion β of locals in the population of consumers, we found that our results are
still valid. Indeed, by substituting the fraction α of e-users with the fraction of e-users among
the population of tourists, i.e. α˜ ≡ α(1− β), one can notice that it is possible to reproduce the
whole analysis carried out in the paper.
A third criticism that can be made to our model is that it assumed a fixed fraction of e-users
in the population of consumers. Although very recent, the proliferation of online reviews is
not a new phenomenon. Consumers already got used to online information provided by review
aggregators. We are mainly interested in the consequences of allowing or not discounts in terms
of how many merchants can afford to go online rather than in the rise of online aggregators.
We also acknowledge that our analysis has been performed under some specific parametric
conditions. However, such conditions have been always justified not only for algebraic tractabil-
ity, but also for being well suited to the specific market case that we wanted to study. All in all,
we are also convinced that the basic model that we provided allows to capture the impact of
online aggregators in a simple but significant way.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
In the derivations preceding Lemma 1 we have guessed that p∗on ≤ v − t/4. That is, the price
that the online restaurants charge in equilibrium does not repel walkers. We also did not check
deviations to prices above v − t/4.
1. First, we will show that whenever
p∗on = v −
t
4
,
an online restaurant will not benefit from deviating to a price p ∈ (v − t/4, v]. Indeed,
the deviating restaurant will only attract 2αxˆ customers, where
xˆ =
1
2n
+
v − t4 − p
2t
.
Hence, its profit will be
2α
(
1
2n
+
v − t4 − p
2t
)
(p− c).
Differentiating with respect to p and setting the derivative to zero yields
−1
t
(p− c) + 1
n
+
v − t/4− p
t
= 0,
p =
c+ tn + v − t4
2
.
Observe that this price is below v − t/4:
c+ tn + v − t4
2
< v − t
4
,
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v − c > t
n
+
t
4
,
which holds for any n ≥ 2 under the assumption (1). This confirms that deviations to
prices above v − t/4 are not profitable.
2. Next, we will show that the equilibrium price p∗on cannot exceed v − t/4. Suppose the
contrary, p∗on > v − t/4. The walkers are not served by the online restaurants, hence
p∗on = c+
t
n
.
However,
c+
t
n
< v − t
4
holds for any n ≥ 2 under the assumption (1). This contradicts the supposition.
3. For the threshold α0(n) we solve
c+
(1− α)t
αN
+
t
n
= v − t
4
,
α0(n) =
t
t+N
(
v − t4 − tn − c
) .
Observe that α0(n) < 1, as
v − t
4
− t
n
− c > 0
for all n ≥ 2 due to the assumption (1).
Proof of Proposition 1.
That pi∗on(n) decreases in n can be easily seen from (3) and (4). Indeed, since
c+
(1− α)t
αN
+
t
n
decreases in n,
p∗on(n) = min
{
c+
(1− α)t
αN
+
t
n
, v − t
4
}
decreases in n. Next, because both
1− α
N
+
α
n
and
p∗on(n)− c
decrease in n,
pi∗on(n) =
(
1− α
N
+
α
n
)
(p∗on(n)− c)
decreases in n. The rest of the proof is completed in three steps:
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1. If k is small,
k ≤ pi∗on(N)− pi∗off =

α(v− t4−c)
N +
t
N2α
− v−
t
4
−c
N if α ≥ tN(v− t4−c)
α(v− t4−c)
N if otherwise,
then n∗ = N .
2. If k > pi∗on(N)− pi∗off , the equilibrium number of restaurants is determined by
1− α
N
(
v − t
4
− c
)
=
(
1− α
N
+
α
n
)2 t
α
− k
for large values of α, so
n∗ =
α√(
k + 1−αN
(
v − t4 − c
))
α
t − 1−αN
.
If α is small, (5) becomes
1− α
N
(
v − t
4
− c
)
=
(
1− α
N
+
α
n
)(
v − t
4
− c
)
− k,
hence
n∗ =
α
(
v − t4 − c
)
k
.
The threshold value for α can be found from
α√(
k + 1−αN
(
v − t4 − c
))
α
t − 1−αN
=
α
(
v − t4 − c
)
k
,
α =
t+ tNk
v− t
4
−c
t+N
(
v − t4 − c
) .
Thus, we have
n∗ =

α√
(k+ 1−αN (v− t4−c))αt − 1−αN
if α ≥
t+ tNk
v− t4−c
t+N(v− t4−c)
α(v− t4−c)
k if α <
t+ tNk
v− t4−c
t+N(v− t4−c)
,
or
n∗ =

α√
(k+ 1−αN (v− t4−c))αt − 1−αN
if k ≤ α(v−
t
4
−c)
N +
α(v− t4−c)
2
t −
v− t
4
−c
N
α(v− t4−c)
k if k >
α(v− t4−c)
N +
α(v− t4−c)
2
t −
v− t
4
−c
N .
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3. Combining the results in steps 1 and 2 yields:
n∗ =

N if k ≤ α(v−
t
4
−c)
N +
t
N2α
− v−
t
4
−c
N
α√
(k+ 1−αN (v− t4−c))αt − 1−αN
if k ∈
(
α(v− t4−c)
N +
t
N2α
− v−
t
4
−c
N ,
α(v− t4−c)
N +
α(v− t4−c)
2
t −
v− t
4
−c
N
]
α(v− t4−c)
k if k >
α(v− t4−c)
N +
α(v− t4−c)
2
t −
v− t
4
−c
N
if
α ≥ t
N
(
v − t4 − c
) ,
and
n∗ =
N if k ≤
α(v− t4−c)
N
α(v− t4−c)
k if k >
α(v− t4−c)
N
if
α <
t
N
(
v − t4 − c
) .
Derivation of (7).
When α ≥ α0(n),
p∗on = c+
(1− α)t
αN
+
t
n
.
The deviating restaurant will charge walkers v − t/4 and e-users
pdev = arg max
p≤v− t
4
(
1− α
N
(
v − t
4
− c
)
+ 2αxˆ(p− c)
)
,
where xˆ is determined by
v − p− xˆt = v − p∗on −
(
1
n
− xˆ
)
t,
xˆ =
1
2n
+
p∗on − p
2t
=
1
2n
+
c+ (1−α)tαN +
t
n − p
2t
.
That is,
pdev = arg max
p≤v− t
4
(
1− α
N
(
v − t
4
− c
)
+
2α
t
(
c
2
+
(1− α)t
2αN
+
t
n
− p
2
)
(p− c)
)
.
Differentiating (
c
2
+
(1− α)t
2αN
+
t
n
− p
2
)
(p− c)
with respect to p and setting the derivative to zero yield
pdev = c+
(1− α)t
2αN
+
t
n
.
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Derivation of (8).
When α < α0(n),
p∗on = v −
t
4
.
The deviating restaurant will charge walkers v − t/4 and e-users
pdev = arg max
p≤v− t
4
(
1− α
N
(
v − t
4
− c
)
+ 2αxˆ(p− c)
)
,
where
xˆ =
1
2n
+
p∗on − p
2t
=
1
2n
+
v − t4 − p
2t
.
That is,
pdev = arg max
p≤v− t
4
(
1− α
N
(
v − t
4
− c
)
+
2α
t
(
v
2
− t
8
+
t
2n
− p
2
)
(p− c)
)
.
Differentiating (
v
2
− t
8
+
t
2n
− p
2
)
(p− c)
with respect to p and setting the derivative to zero yield
pdev =
c+ v
2
− t
8
+
t
2n
.
Proof of (9) and (10).
The proof is completed in five steps:
1. First, we show that k2 < k3 for all values of α. When
α <
t
N
(
v − t4 − c
) ,
k2 =
α
(
v − t4 − c
)
N
.
The inequality k2 < k3 can be written as
α
(
v − t4 − c
)
N
<
α
(
v − t4 − c
)2
t
,
or
v − c > t
4
+
t
N
,
which holds for N ≥ 2 under the assumption (1). When
α >
t
N
(
v − t4 − c
) ,
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k2 =
α
(
v − t4 − c
)
N
+
(
α
(
v − t4 − c
)2
t
− v −
t
4 − c
N
)
.
The inequality k2 < k3, obviously, holds.
2. Next, we show that k1 = αt/N2 if and only if α = α2. Indeed, when
α <
t
N
(
v − t4 − c
) ,
k1 =
α2
(
v − t4 − c
)
N
.
It is easy to see that the equation k1 = αt/N2 does not have a solution. When
α >
t
N
(
v − t4 − c
) ,
k1 =
α2
(
v − t4 − c
)
N
−
(
v − t4 − c
N
− t
N2α2
)
.
Solving k1 = αt/N2 yields
α
(
v − t4 − c
)
N
−
(
v − t4 − c
N
− t
N2α
)
=
αt
N2
,
(1− α2)t
N2α
=
(1− α) (v − t4 − c)
N
,
(1 + α)t
Nα
= v − t
4
− c,
α =
t
N
(
v − t4 − c− tN
) = α2.
3. It immediately follows from the previous step that k1 > αt/N2 when α < α2 and k1 <
αt/N2 when α > α2.
4. It is left to show that k4 = αt/N2 if and only if α = α2. We have:
t
4α
(
α
(
v − t4 − c
)
t
− 1− α
N
)2
=
αt
N2
,
(
α
(
v − t4 − c
)
t
− 1− α
N
)2
=
4α2
N2
,
α
(
v − t4 − c
)
t
− 1− α
N
=
2α
N
,
α =
t
N
(
v − t4 − c− tN
) = α2.
5. It immediately follows from the previous step that k4 < αt/N2 when α < α2 and k4 >
αt/N2 when α > α2.
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